Chernobyl Darsteller

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Chernobyl Darsteller

Chernobyl. Chernobyl · Staffeln & Episoden · Besetzung. Stellan Skarsgård erhielt außerdem den Preis für den besten Nebendarsteller in einer Miniserie. Bei der Verleihung der Emmy Awards© im September Im April kommt es im ukrainischen Atommeiler Tschernobyl zu einer katastrophalen Kernschmelze. Feuerwehr und Ersthelfer geben alles, um den Unglücksort zu sichern und die Folgen des Ereignisses einzudämmen - doch diese sind weitreichend.

Cast Chernobyl S01

Besetzung und Synchronisation[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]. Die Synchronisation der Serie wurde bei der Scalamedia nach einem Dialogbuch von Robert. Im Hauptcast von "Chernobyl" sind folgende Schauspieler und Schauspielerinnen zu sehen: Jared Harris spielt Valery Legasov; Emily Watson. Darsteller. Jared Harris – Bild: ProSieben. Jared Harris: Valery Legasov. (5 Folgen, ) · Stellan Skarsgård: Boris Shcherbina.

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Chernobyl Uncensored Documentary

Pavel 11 Fans. Tim Burton's Corpse Bride - Hochzeit mit einer Leiche. Mai Serienstart in Deutschland: 5/6/ · Created by Craig Mazin. With Jessie Buckley, Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgård, Adam Nagaitis. In April , an explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics becomes one of the world's worst man-made catastrophes/10(K). 11 rows · Chernobyl ist eine US-amerikanisch-britische Miniserie des Senders HBO, die vom Originalsprache: Englisch. Chernobyl Schauspieler, Cast & Crew. Liste der Besetung: Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgård, Emily Watson u.v.m. Chernobyl is a nuclear power plant in Ukraine that was the site of the worst nuclear accident in history when a routine test went horribly wrong on April 26, He began his career at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in September During his first years at Chernobyl, he held positions of the engineer of boilers, the senior engineer of boilers of the workshop of thermal and underground communications, the operator of the 6th group, the senior operator of the group 7 of the main circulation pump of the 4th unit of the reactor workshop. Inside the destroyed block, the Chernobyl victims installed a Memorial plaque with a portrait of Valery Khodemchuk. Access to this deadly space is strictly prohibited. And yet the portrait always has fresh flowers. The Chernobyl disaster was a nuclear disaster which occurred on April 26, at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Pripyat, Ukraine. At that time, Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union. This event was one of the worst accidents in the history of nuclear power. Volunteers überfall Englisch wetsuits and respirators for protection against radioactive aerosolsand equipped with dosimetersentered the knee-deep radioactive water and managed to open the valves. The decommissioned Chernobyl nuclear power station, Ukraine. Archived from the original on Maischbergr December
Chernobyl Darsteller

Alexandr Akimov 4 episodes, Karl Davies Viktor Proskuryakov 3 episodes, Michael Socha Mikhail 3 episodes, Laura Elphinstone Oksana 3 episodes, Jan Ricica Oksana's Kid 3 episodes, Adrian Rawlins Nikolai Fomin 3 episodes, Alan Williams KGB Chairman Charkov 3 episodes, Con O'Neill Viktor Bryukhanov 3 episodes, Douggie McMeekin Yuvchenko 2 episodes, Nadia Clifford Svetlana Zinchenko 2 episodes, David Dencik Mikhail Gorbachev 2 episodes, Gerard Kearns Pravik 2 episodes, Mark Lewis Jones General Pikalov 2 episodes, Adam Lundgren Brazhnik 2 episodes, Michael Shaeffer Blond Man 2 episodes, Jamie Sives Sitnikov 2 episodes, Ron Cook Old Maternity Doctor 2 episodes, Povilas Jatkevicius Kibenok 2 episodes, Jay Simpson Perevozchenko 2 episodes, Joshua Leese Kirschenbaum 2 episodes, Ross Armstrong Nikolai Gorbachenko 2 episodes, Paulius Markevicius Boris Stolyarchuk 2 episodes, Ralph Ineson General Tarakanov 2 episodes, Baltasar Breki Samper Ananenko 2 episodes, Barry Keoghan Pavel 2 episodes, Philip Barantini Bezpalov 2 episodes, Amanda Drew Baranov 2 episodes, Karolis Kasperavicius A commission was established later in the day to investigate the accident.

It was headed by Valery Legasov , First Deputy Director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and included leading nuclear specialist Evgeny Velikhov , hydro-meteorologist Yuri Izrael , radiologist Leonid Ilyin, and others.

They flew to Boryspil International Airport and arrived at the power plant in the evening of 26 April.

The delegation soon had ample evidence that the reactor was destroyed and extremely high levels of radiation had caused a number of cases of radiation exposure.

Initially it was decided to evacuate the population for three days; later this was made permanent. By on 27 April, buses had arrived in Pripyat to start the evacuation.

A translated excerpt of the evacuation announcement follows:. For the attention of the residents of Pripyat! The City Council informs you that due to the accident at Chernobyl Power Station in the city of Pripyat the radioactive conditions in the vicinity are deteriorating.

The Communist Party, its officials and the armed forces are taking necessary steps to combat this. Nevertheless, with the view to keep people as safe and healthy as possible, the children being top priority, we need to temporarily evacuate the citizens in the nearest towns of Kiev region.

For these reasons, starting from 27 April , each apartment block will be able to have a bus at its disposal, supervised by the police and the city officials.

It is highly advisable to take your documents, some vital personal belongings and a certain amount of food, just in case, with you.

The senior executives of public and industrial facilities of the city has decided on the list of employees needed to stay in Pripyat to maintain these facilities in a good working order.

All the houses will be guarded by the police during the evacuation period. Comrades, leaving your residences temporarily please make sure you have turned off the lights, electrical equipment and water and shut the windows.

Please keep calm and orderly in the process of this short-term evacuation. To expedite the evacuation, residents were told to bring only what was necessary, and that they would remain evacuated for approximately three days.

As a result, most personal belongings were left behind, and remain there today. By , 53, people were evacuated to various villages of the Kiev region.

The surveying and detection of isolated fallout hotspots outside this zone over the following year eventually resulted in , long-term evacuees in total agreeing to be moved.

Evacuation began one and a half days before the accident was publicly acknowledged by the Soviet Union. Workers at Forsmark reported the case to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority , which determined that the radiation had originated elsewhere.

That day, the Swedish government contacted the Soviet government to inquire about whether there had been a nuclear accident in the Soviet Union.

The Soviets initially denied it, and it was only after the Swedish government suggested they were about to file an official alert with the International Atomic Energy Agency , that the Soviet government admitted that an accident had taken place at Chernobyl.

At first, the Soviets only conceded that a minor accident had occurred, but once they began evacuating more than , people, the full scale of the situation was realized by the global community.

One of the nuclear reactors was damaged. The effects of the accident are being remedied. Assistance has been provided for any affected people. An investigative commission has been set up.

This was the entire announcement, and the first time the Soviet Union officially announced a nuclear accident. The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union TASS then discussed the Three Mile Island accident and other American nuclear accidents, which Serge Schmemann of The New York Times wrote was an example of the common Soviet tactic of whataboutism.

The mention of a commission, however, indicated to observers the seriousness of the incident, [70] and subsequent state radio broadcasts were replaced with classical music, which was a common method of preparing the public for an announcement of a tragedy.

Around the same time, ABC News released its report about the disaster. There she spoke with members of medical staff and people, who were calm and hopeful that they could soon return to their homes.

Shevchenko returned home near midnight, stopping at a radiological checkpoint in Vilcha, one of the first that were set up soon after the accident.

There was a notification from Moscow that there was no reason to postpone the 1 May International Workers' Day celebrations in Kiev including the annual parade , but on 30 April a meeting of the Political bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU took place to discuss the plan for the upcoming celebration.

Scientists were reporting that the radiological background level in Kiev was normal. At the meeting, which was finished at , it was decided to shorten celebrations from the regular three and a half to four hours to under two hours.

These included the Jupiter factory which closed in and the Azure Swimming Pool , used by the Chernobyl liquidators for recreation during the clean-up, which closed in Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir for the emergency cooling pumps and as a pressure suppression system capable of condensing steam in case of a small broken steam pipe; the third floor above them, below the reactor, served as a steam tunnel.

The steam released by a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into the pools to bubble through a layer of water.

After the disaster, the pools and the basement were flooded because of ruptured cooling water pipes and accumulated firefighting water, thus constituting a serious steam explosion risk.

It became necessary to drain the pool. The bubbler pool could be drained by opening its sluice gates.

The valves controlling it, however, were located in a flooded corridor. Volunteers in wetsuits and respirators for protection against radioactive aerosols , and equipped with dosimeters , entered the knee-deep radioactive water and managed to open the valves.

All three men were awarded the Order For Courage by Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in May Research by Andrew Leatherbarrow, author of Chernobyl , [79] determined that the frequently recounted story that suggests that all three men died just days after the incident is false.

Alexei Ananenko continues to work in the nuclear energy industry, and rebuffs the growth of the Chernobyl media sensationalism surrounding him.

Once the bubbler pool gates were opened by the Ananenko team, fire brigade pumps were then used to drain the basement.

The operation was not completed until 8 May, after 20, tonnes 20, long tons; 22, short tons of water were pumped out. With the bubbler pool gone, a meltdown was less likely to produce a powerful steam explosion.

To do so, the molten core would now have to reach the water table below the reactor. To reduce the likelihood of this, it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the reactor, which would also stabilize the foundations.

Using oil well drilling equipment, the injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May. As an alternative, coal miners were deployed to excavate a tunnel below the reactor to make room for a cooling system.

The final makeshift design for the cooling system was to incorporate a coiled formation of pipes cooled with water and covered on top with a thin thermally conductive graphite layer.

The graphite layer as a natural refractory material would rapidly cool the suspected molten uranium oxide without burn through.

This graphite cooling plate layer was to be encapsulated between two concrete layers, each one meter thick for stabilisation.

This system was designed by Bolshov, the director of the Institute for Nuclear Safety and Development formed in Bolshov's graphite-concrete "sandwich" would be similar in concept to later core catchers that are now part of many nuclear reactor designs.

Bolshov's graphite cooling plate, alongside the prior nitrogen injection proposal, were not used following the drop in aerial temperatures and indicative reports that the fuel melt had stopped.

It was later determined that the fuel had passed through three storeys before coming to rest in one of a number of basement rooms. The precautionary underground channel with its active cooling was therefore deemed redundant, as the fuel was self-cooling.

The excavation was then simply filled with concrete to strengthen the foundation below the reactor. In the months after the explosion attention turned to removing the radioactive debris from the roof.

The Soviets used approximately 60 remote-controlled robots, most of them built in the Soviet Union itself.

Many failed due to the effect of high levels of radiation on their electronic controls; [90] in , Valery Legasov , first deputy director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, said: "We learned that robots are not the great remedy for everything.

Where there was very high radiation, the robot ceased to be a robot—the electronics quit working. Though the soldiers were only supposed to perform the role of the "bio-robot" a maximum of once, some soldiers reported having done this task five or six times.

To provide radiological protection by prevention of airborne contamination, and prevent weathering of the reactor remains, a containment structure was planned.

This was the largest civil engineering task in history [ definition needed ] , involving a quarter of a million construction workers who all reached their official lifetime limits of radiation.

During the construction of the sarcophagus, a scientific team re-entered the reactor as part of an investigation dubbed "Complex Expedition", to locate and contain nuclear fuel in a way that could not lead to another explosion.

These scientists manually collected cold fuel rods, but great heat was still emanating from the core.

Rates of radiation in different parts of the building were monitored by drilling holes into the reactor and inserting long metal detector tubes.

The scientists were exposed to high levels of radiation and radioactive dust. The concrete beneath the reactor was steaming hot, and was breached by now-solidified lava and spectacular unknown crystalline forms termed chernobylite.

It was concluded that there was no further risk of explosion. The official contaminated zones saw a massive clean-up effort lasting seven months.

Defence forces must have done much of the work. Yet this land was of marginal agricultural value. According to historian David Marples, the administration had a psychological purpose for the clean-up: they wished to forestall panic regarding nuclear energy, and even to restart the Chernobyl power station.

Scavengers have since removed many functioning, but highly radioactive, parts. Many, if not most of them, exceeded radiation safety limits. To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA used the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group INSAG , which had been created by the IAEA in In summary, according to INSAG-1, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions, but according to INSAG-7, the main cause was the reactor's design.

This was stated to be inherent not only in operations but also during design, engineering, construction, manufacture and regulation.

Views of the main causes were heavily lobbied by different groups, including the reactor's designers, power plant personnel, and the Soviet and Ukrainian governments.

This was due to the uncertainty about the actual sequence of events and plant parameters. After INSAG-1 more information became available, and more powerful computing has allowed better forensic simulations.

The first Soviet official explanation of the accident was by means of presentations from leading Soviet scientists and engineers to a large number of representatives from IAEA member states and other international organisations at the first Post-Accident Review Meeting, held at the IAEA in Vienna between 25 and 29 August This explanation effectively placed the blame on the power plant operators.

The UKAEA INSAG-1 report followed shortly afterwards in September , and on the whole also supported this view, based also on the information provided in discussions with the Soviet experts at the Vienna review meeting.

For instance; "During preparation and testing of the turbine generator under run-down conditions using the auxiliary load, personnel disconnected a series of technical protection systems and breached the most important operational safety provisions for conducting a technical exercise.

It was stated that at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key safety systems turned off, most notably the Emergency Core Cooling System ECCS , LAR Local Automatic control system , and AZ emergency power reduction system.

Personnel had an insufficient understanding of technical procedures involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly ignored regulations to expedite the electrical test completion.

The main process computer, SKALA, was running in such a way that the main control computer could not shut down the reactor or even reduce power.

Normally the computer would have started to insert all of the control rods. The computer would have also started the "Emergency Core Protection System" that introduces 24 control rods into the active zone within 2.

All control was transferred from the process computer to the human operators. It was held that the designers of the reactor considered this combination of events to be impossible and therefore did not allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing the combination of events that led to the crisis, namely the intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating procedures.

Thus the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule infringement plus the operational routine allowed by the power station staff.

On the disconnection of safety systems, Valery Legasov said in , "It was like airplane pilots experimenting with the engines in flight. This view was reflected in numerous publications and artistic works on the theme of the Chernobyl accident that appeared immediately after the accident, [26] and for a long time remained dominant in the public consciousness and in popular publications.

The trial took place from 7 to 30 July in a temporary courtroom set up in the House of Culture in the city of Chernobyl, Ukraine. Five plant employees the former deputy chief engineer Anatoly S.

Dyatlov ; the former plant director Viktor P. Bryukhanov ; the former chief engineer Nikolai M. Fomin ; the shift director of Reactor 4, Boris V.

Rogozhin ; and the chief of Reactor 4, Aleksandr P. Kovalenko and Gosatomenergonadzor USSR State Committee on Supervision of Safe Conduct of Work in Atomic Energy inspector Yuri A.

Laushkin were sentenced to 10, 10, 10, five, three and two years respectively in labor camps. Anatoly Dyatlov was found guilty "of criminal mismanagement of potentially explosive enterprises" and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment—of which he would serve three [] —for the role that his oversight of the experiment played in the ensuing accident.

In a Commission of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power reassessed the causes and circumstances of the Chernobyl accident and came to new insights and conclusions.

Based on that, INSAG published an additional report, INSAG-7, [4] which reviewed "that part of the INSAG-1 report in which primary attention is given to the reasons for the accident," and this included the text of the USSR State Commission report translated into English by the IAEA as Annex I.

By the time of this report, Ukraine had declassified a number of KGB documents from the period between and related to the Chernobyl plant.

It mentioned, for example, previous reports of structural damage caused by negligence during construction of the plant such as splitting of concrete layers that were never acted upon.

They documented more than 29 emergency situations in the plant during this period, eight of which were caused by negligence or poor competence on the part of personnel.

In the INSAG-7 report, most of the earlier accusations against staff for breach of regulations were acknowledged to be either erroneous, being based on incorrect information obtained in August , or less relevant.

The INSAG-7 report also reflected the view of the USSR State Commission account which held that the operators' actions in turning off the Emergency Core Cooling System, interfering with the settings on the protection equipment, and blocking the level and pressure in the separator drum did not contribute to the original cause of the accident and its magnitude, although they may have been a breach of regulations.

In fact, turning off the emergency system designed to prevent the two turbine generators from stopping was not a violation of regulations.

The primary design cause of the accident, as determined by INSAG-7, was a major deficiency in safety features, [4] : 22 in particular the "positive scram" effect due to the control rods' graphite tips that actually initially increased reactivity when control rods entered the core to reduce reactivity.

Yet "post-accident studies have shown that the way in which the real role of the ORM is reflected in the Operating Procedures and design documentation for the RBMK is extremely contradictory", and furthermore, "ORM was not treated as an operational safety limit, violation of which could lead to an accident".

Even in this revised analysis, the human factor remained identified as a major factor in causing the accident; particularly the operating crew's deviation from the test programme.

The assertions of Soviet experts notwithstanding, regulations did not prohibit operating the reactor at this low power level. INSAG-7 also said, "The poor quality of operating procedures and instructions, and their conflicting character, put a heavy burden on the operating crew, including the chief engineer.

The accident can be said to have flowed from a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time.

In summary, the major factors were: [4] : 18— The reactor had a dangerously large positive void coefficient of reactivity.

The void coefficient is a measurement of how a reactor responds to increased steam formation in the water coolant. Most other reactor designs have a negative coefficient, i.

Faster neutrons are less likely to split uranium atoms, so the reactor produces less power negative feedback effect. Chernobyl's RBMK reactor, however, used solid graphite as a neutron moderator to slow down the neutrons , and the cooling water acted as a neutron absorber.

Thus neutrons are moderated by the graphite even if steam bubbles form in the water. Furthermore, because steam absorbs neutrons much less readily than water, increasing the voids means that more moderated neutrons are able to split uranium atoms, increasing the reactor's power output.

This was a positive feedback regenerative process which makes the RBMK design very unstable at low power levels, and prone to sudden energy surges to a dangerous level.

Not only was this behaviour counter-intuitive, this property of the reactor under certain extreme conditions was unknown to the crew.

There was a significant flaw in the design of the control rods that were inserted into the reactor to slow down the reaction rate by neutron absorption.

In the RBMK design, the bottom tip of each control rod was made of graphite and was 1. Only the upper part of the rod was made of boron carbide , which absorbs neutrons and thereby slows the reaction.

With this design, when a rod was inserted from the fully retracted position, the graphite tip displaced neutron-absorbing water, initially causing fewer neutrons to be absorbed and increasing reactivity.

For the first few seconds of rod deployment, reactor core power was therefore increased, rather than reduced.

This feature of control rod operation was counter-intuitive and not known to the reactor operators. Other deficiencies were noted in the RBMK reactor design, as were its non-compliance with accepted standards and with the requirements of nuclear reactor safety.

While INSAG-1 and INSAG-7 reports both identified operator error as an issue of concern, the INSAG-7 identified that there were numerous other issues that were contributing factors that led to the incident.

These contributing factors include:. The force of the second explosion and the ratio of xenon radioisotopes released after the accident led Yuri V.

Dubasov in to theorise that the second explosion could have been an extremely fast nuclear power transient resulting from core material melting in the absence of its water coolant and moderator.

Dubasov argued that there was no delayed supercritical increase in power but a runaway prompt criticality which would have developed much faster.

He felt the physics of this would be more similar to the explosion of a fizzled nuclear weapon , and it produced the second explosion.

Khlopin Radium Institute measured anomalous high levels of xenon — a short half-life isotope — four days after the explosion. This meant that a nuclear event in the reactor may have ejected xenon to higher altitudes in the atmosphere than the later fire did, allowing widespread movement of xenon to remote locations.

Both his and analyses argue that the nuclear fizzle event, whether producing the second or first explosion, consisted of a prompt chain reaction that was limited to a small portion of the reactor core, since self-disassembly occurs rapidly in fizzle events.

Dubasov's nuclear fizzle hypothesis was examined in by physicist Lars-Erik De Geer who put the hypothesized fizzle event as the more probable cause of the first explosion.

This jet then rammed the tubes' kg plugs, continued through the roof and travelled into the atmosphere to altitudes of 2. The steam explosion which ruptured the reactor vessel occurred some 2.

Although it is difficult to compare releases between the Chernobyl accident and a deliberate air burst nuclear detonation, it has still been estimated that about four hundred times more radioactive material was released from Chernobyl than by the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki together.

However, the Chernobyl accident only released about one hundredth to one thousandth of the total amount of radioactivity released during nuclear weapons testing at the height of the Cold War ; the wide estimate being due to the different abundances of isotopes released.

The initial evidence that a major release of radioactive material was affecting other countries came not from Soviet sources, but from Sweden.

Those countries have been burdened with continuing costs for decontamination removing the radiation and health care because of the accident.

Exposure to radiation leads to a higher risk of getting cancer , a deadly disease. It is difficult to accurately tell the number of deaths caused by the events at Chernobyl.

The Chernobyl accident happened when some workers were testing the safety of the reactor. Some of the devices that stopped the reactor from exploding were switched off.

Then, there was a power surge; the reactor fell out of control and exploded. Most of the people affected have not died yet. When and if the people involved die of cancer, or related diseases, it will be hard to tell if this was because of the accident.

Deutschsprachige Erstausstrahlung. Mai auf Sky Atlantic HD. Waleri Legassow. Boris Schtscherbina. Wassili Ignatenko. Alexander Akimow. Sam Troughton.

Robert Emms. Anatoli Djatlow. Paul Ritter. Michail Gorbatschow. General Pikalow. Alan Williams. Rainer Gerlach. Am Genau zwei Jahre und einen Tag früher beobachtet Ljudmila, die schwangere Frau des Feuerwehrmanns Wassili Ignatenko , in Prypjat eine Explosion im Kernkraftwerk Tschernobyl.

Im Kontrollraum von Block 4 des Kraftwerks ignoriert in dem Moment Djatlow die Einschätzung von Akimow , Toptunow und anderer Untergebenen, die erkennen, dass der Reaktor explodiert ist.

Der Reaktorkern liegt frei, brennt und lässt sich unter keinen Umständen kontrollieren. Nachdem die Feuerwehr an den Ort des Geschehens gerufen wurde, sieht Ignatenko einen anderen Feuerwehrmann einen Geröllblock Graphit aufheben.

Kurz danach erleidet dieser Feuerwehrmann nukleare Verbrennungen an seiner Hand. Djatlow erkrankt an der akuten Strahlenkrankheit und Anatoli A.

Sitnikow, der auf der Gefährlichkeit des Vorfalls bestanden hat, wird auf das Dach des Reaktors geschickt, um sich noch einmal zu vergewissern.

Night Shift Worker 1 episode, Alex Blake Petrovich 1 episode, Daniel Crossley Stasiuk 1 episode, Lucy Russell Marina Gruzinskaya 1 episode, Diarmaid Murtagh Zukauskas 1 episode, Natasha Radski Russian News Reader 1 episode, Yitzchak Averbuch General 1 episode, Joe Tucker Plant Employee 1 episode, Kadrolsha Ona Carole Civilian in a Hospital uncredited unknown episodes Bartas Erminas Civilian in a Hospital uncredited unknown episodes Dainius Jucius Minister of Finance of Pripyat uncredited unknown episodes Roman Listopad Civilian uncredited unknown episodes Danguole Ragazinskaite Civilian uncredited unknown episodes Petras Simonis Dyatlov's Guard uncredited unknown episodes Jimmy Walker Line Producer: Russia 1 episode, Michael Kitaev Daily makeup artist 1 episode, Ailsa Lawson Head of Production 5 episodes, Olya Kosenko Prop modeller 5 episodes, Zoya Kosulina Scenic Artist 5 episodes, Asta Ostrovskaja Prop modeller 5 episodes, Henrikas Piktuizis Scenic Artist 5 episodes, Elo Soode Concept Artist 5 episodes, Rebecca Timons Prop modeller 5 episodes, Egidijus Vaitkevicius Prop maker 2 episodes, Arturas Labukas Supervising Art Director 1 episode, Emma Savill Source Connect Engineer 5 episodes, Stefan Henrix Second unit boom operator 2 episodes, Michael Botha ADR Mixer 1 episode, Craig Burns Prep lead: DNEG 5 episodes, Rajat Amin VFX Department Production Manager 5 episodes, Christopher Antoniou Asset Supervisor 5 episodes, Robin Aristorenas VFX Editor: DNEG 5 episodes, Laura Bethencourt VFX Line Producer: DNEG 5 episodes, Oliver Blackaby Lead Compositor 5 episodes, George Butler Senior Compositor 5 episodes, Alistair Darby CG artist: Double Negative 5 episodes, Patrick Dean Body Track Lead 5 episodes, Adrian Dudak IT Support: Dneg 5 episodes, William Foulser Sequence lead compositor: At DNEG TV 5 episodes, Russell Hopwood Lead Compositor: DNEG 5 episodes, Robin Konieczny Suresh Kumar VFX Production Manager: DNEG 5 episodes, Lakshmanakumar Matchmove artist: Dneg 5 episodes, Simon Pabst Lead data wrangler 5 episodes, Tom Pegg In house: Senior Compositor 5 episodes, Jose Rebollo Redondo Editorial IO Assistant 5 episodes, Jordan Rice Roto artist: Dneg 5 episodes, Alankit Thapa Gangs of London.

Chris Fry. Carolyn Strauss. Game of Thrones. Jakob Ihre. Oslo, Jinx Godfrey. Die Entdeckung der Unendlichkeit. Simon Smith. Philip K. Dick's Electric Dreams.

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Chernobyl Darsteller
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Chernobyl Darsteller Johan Renck. Software Developer uncredited unknown episodes Chip N Dale Cordingley Chernobyl Children Mega Gehalt Rtl Children of Chernobyl Benefit Chernobyl Darsteller Chernobyl Forum Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme Chernobyl Shelter Fund Friends of Chernobyl's Children State Institution for Radiation Pauly Shore Filme and Radiation Safety. Mikhail 3 episodes, France, Germany: A tale of two nuclear nations, The Edmonton Journal Schiffbruch Film, 25 May Archived from the original on 26 April Gusev; Angelina Konstantinovna Guskova; Fred Albert Mettler The official contaminated zones saw a massive clean-up effort lasting seven months. Drone Operator 5 episodes, Rolandas Joneliukstis The four most harmful radionuclides spread from Chernobyl were iodinecaesiumcaesium and strontium Tattoo Tod, with half-lives of 8. Celebrate Black History Month with IMDb's exclusive galleries, recommendations, videos, and more. Im April kommt es im ukrainischen Atommeiler Tschernobyl zu einer katastrophalen Kernschmelze. Feuerwehr und Ersthelfer geben alles, um den Unglücksort zu sichern und die Folgen des Ereignisses einzudämmen - doch diese sind weitreichend. Besetzung und Synchronisation[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]. Die Synchronisation der Serie wurde bei der Scalamedia nach einem Dialogbuch von Robert. Chernobyl Schauspieler, Cast & Crew. Liste der Besetung: Jared Harris, Stellan Skarsgård, Emily Watson u.v.m. Finde alle Informationen zur Besetzung das Staffel 1 von Chernobyl: Schauspieler, Regisseur und Drehbuchautoren.


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